Policy

By: Luis Carlos Jemio Ph.D.*

In October 2025, the National Institute of Statistics (INE) presented the updated national accounts for the country, a project that received technical support from ECLAC and the IMF. The new series of national accounts published by the INE includes significant methodological changes. First, the previous fixed-base GDP calculation system, which used 1990 as the base year for calculating GDP at constant prices, has been replaced by the chained variable-base system, the most widely used system in the world. Second, the INE undertook a significant statistical effort to calculate the updated national accounts, resulting in broader coverage of the national economy, including activities previously excluded from the calculation.

This new series of national accounts has resulted in a redefinition of the size of the economy, and therefore changes in the value of several commonly used macroeconomic variables and indicators, relative to their values calculated using the 1990 fixed-base GDP series, such as: GDP level, GDP per capita, GDP growth, fiscal deficit, public debt, etc. The following sections analyze some of the effects of the change in the national accounts series on these variables and indicators.

Nominal GDP and GDP per capita

As mentioned earlier, the calculation of the new national accounts series represents a significant statistical effort by the INE, which allowed for the inclusion of activities previously excluded from GDP calculations. As a result of this broader coverage, nominal GDP increased between 15% and 20% compared to the values in the previous series. Thus, nominal GDP in 2024 reached US$54,487 million (using the official exchange rate for this calculation), 17.7% higher than the value calculated using the previous fixed-base methodology.

Nominal GDP

(millions US$)

Source: Prepared based on information from the INE

 

As a result of the change in the nominal value of GDP, there has also been a change in Bolivia’s GDP per capita. Using the previous series, GDP per capita for 2024 reached US$4,073 per inhabitant, while with the new series it stands at US$4,794 per inhabitant (17.7% higher).

GDP per capita 2024

(US$ per inhabitant)

Source: Prepared based on information from the INE

 

GDP growth

Another indicator that has varied with the methodological change in the calculation of national accounts is the real GDP growth rate. There are differences in the formula for calculating the GDP growth rate between the two methodologies:

a.In the fixed-base system, which in the case of Bolivia’s national accounts was 1990, the formula used is:

              b.In the chained series system, the formula used is:

Where:

 

gbf_t : GDP growth rate for year t, relative to year t-1, fixed base system

gse_t: GDP growth rate for year t relative to year t-1, chained series system

P₀ : prices from base year 0 (year 1990 in the case of Bolivia)

P_t—1: prices for year t-1

Q_t : quantities produced in period t

Q_t—1  : quantities produced in period t-1

 

Real GDP growth

(annual % change)

Source: Prepared based on information from the INE

 

There are some noteworthy aspects to consider when examining the two GDP growth series. First, it is striking that the GDP decline in 2020, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, is significantly higher when calculated using the new methodology (-12.72%) compared to the previous methodology (-8.7%). Conversely, the GDP growth rate in 2021, resulting from the economic recovery from the pandemic’s effects, is also considerably higher when calculated using the new methodology (10.03%) compared to the fixed-base methodology (6.11%). This is due to the greater weight of the sectors that experienced the largest declines during the pandemic (services and construction) in GDP.

Another striking aspect is that, with the new methodology, a GDP decline had already occurred in 2024 (-1.12%), which was not the case when growth was calculated using the previous methodology (0.73%). This shows that the economy was already in recession in 2024, registering negative growth rates for two consecutive quarters. This is also due to the greater weight of extractive activities in GDP today, which experienced the largest declines in 2024 and 2025.

 

Fiscal Deficit and Public Debt

Finally, other indicators that also changed when calculated using the new GDP series are the fiscal deficit and public debt. Since nominal GDP is higher when calculated with the new methodology, the fiscal deficit is lower as a percentage of GDP. As can be seen in the following graph, the deficit for 2024, which reached 10.2% of GDP when calculated using the nominal GDP of the 1990 fixed-base series, is reduced to 8.7% of GDP with the GDP of the new series. This does not mean, of course, that the country’s fiscal situation is less critical, but rather that the analysis of this and other economic issues must be adjusted to these new values for these indicators, since fiscal targets and rules are usually set as a percentage of GDP.

 

SPNF deficit

(percentage of GDP)

Source: Prepared based on information from the MEFP and INE

 

Another indicator closely linked to the previous one is the debt-to-GDP ratio. This is a key indicator for assessing the sustainability of public debt, as an upward trend in this indicator would show that the debt is on an unsustainable trajectory. Conversely, if this ratio remains stable or tends to decrease, the debt would be in a sustainable situation. This indicator is usually included as a target in the fiscal rules and fiscal responsibility laws that countries adopt to ensure fiscal sustainability.

As can be seen in the following graph, the debt-to-GDP ratio reached 82.0% of GDP in 2024, using the GDP from the previous fixed-base series, while with the new series, the ratio falls to 69.7% of GDP. Again, this change does not mean that the sustainability of public debt in Bolivia has improved, but rather that this issue should be analyzed considering these new values for this indicator.

 

 Public Debt

(percentage of GDP)

Source: Prepared based on information from MEFP, BCB and INE

 

In summary, the new series of national accounts recently published by the represents a significant methodological advance, as it places Bolivia among the countries using this new system, which is employed in most countries. Furthermore, an effort has been made to broaden the coverage of the accounts to include a larger share of economic activities, leading to a redefinition of the size of the economy and GDP. This, of course, has modified the values of some variables and indicators commonly used in economic analysis and evaluation.

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* Senior Researcher at INESAD, ljemio@inesad.edu.bo

This blog is part of the ADÁMAS ECONÓMICO Project.

The views expressed in the blog are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of their institutions or INESAD.

By: Luis Carlos Jemio Ph.D.*

The fiscal deficit has been the factor that most contributed to the profound economic crisis affecting the Bolivian economy. From 2015 to 2024, the NFPS deficit averaged 8.7% of GDP annually. These deficits have been financed primarily from domestic sources (approximately 80%). Of the total domestic financing, approximately 80% came from the Central Bank, and the remainder from other sources, primarily the placement of TGN bonds in pension funds.

In 2025, the government has continued its policy of maintaining a high fiscal deficit, financing it primarily through domestic sources (the Central Bank and pension funds). However, the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance (MEFP) has not published any data on NFPS operations for this year to date, despite the importance and necessity of having this information to monitor economic performance, especially in the current situation, when a change of government is approaching, and the new authorities will be responsible for correcting this significant imbalance.

However, it is possible to estimate the fiscal deficit for 2025 based on available data on the evolution of public debt, both external and domestic, published by the Central Bank and the Ministry of Economy through July. According to this information, during the January-July 2025 period, the NFPS received total financing of US$2.604 billion (4.64% of GDP), an amount equivalent to the fiscal deficit incurred during this period. As has been the trend in recent years, financing came mainly from domestic sources (4.25% of GDP), of which US$1.191 billion (2.12% of GDP) was financed by the Central Bank of Bolivia (BCB) and US$1.196 billion (2.13% of GDP) came from private sources, mainly pension funds. Net external financing was only 0.39% of GDP (US$218 million), of which US$764 million were new disbursements and US$547 million were amortizations.

 

Estimated funding to the SPNF as of July 2025 (flows)

	Millions of US$	% of GDP
Internal Debt	2,387	4.25
Private	1,196	2.13
BCB	1,191	2.12
External Debt	218	0.39
Disbursements	764	1.36
Amortizations	547	0.97
Total	2,604	4.64

Source: Prepared based on information from the MEFP and BCB

 

The question is: how large could the fiscal deficit be for the entire year 2025, given the deficit reached through July? The following chart shows, first, that the deficit for the January-July period has been increasing in recent years. Second, it is observed that the majority of the deficit is generated in the second half of the year, due to the fact that a majority of public spending is concentrated in the final months of the year, as is the case with the payment of end of the year bonuses. For this reason, the fiscal deficit for 2025 is expected to be at levels similar to or higher than those reached in 2023 and 2024, that is, above 10% of GDP.

 

Annual SPNF deficit and as of July of each year

(percentage of GDP)

Source: Prepared based on information from the MEFP and BCB

* estimated

 

The high fiscal deficit observed through July 2025 will once again increase public debt, which has been steadily growing in recent years. By July 2025, it will reach US$44.06 billion, of which US$30.289 billion is domestic debt and US$13.77 billion is external debt. It is interesting to note that, although public debt has continued to grow in absolute terms through 2025, it has shown a significant decline as a percentage of GDP. This is because domestic debt is primarily denominated in bolivianos and is not indexed to the dollar or inflation. Nominal GDP has continued to grow at increasingly higher rates due to the higher inflation experienced by the Bolivian economy, although the real GDP growth rate is becoming increasingly lower.

 

SPNF debt

(US$ millions)

	2022	2023	2024	by July 2025
Internal Debt	17,266	22,551	27,903	30,289
Private	6,805	8,025	9,380	10,576
BCB	10,462	14,525	18,523	19,714
External Debt	13,300	13,588	13,345	13,770
Total debt	30,567	36,139	41,248	44,060
Total Debt (% of GDP)	70.0	80.6	89.1	78.5

Source: Prepared based on information from the MEFP and BCB

 

In summary, public debt has continued to increase in absolute terms throughout 2025, due to the fiscal deficit remaining at high levels. As of July of this year, total financing to the NFPS, both external and domestic, amounts to US$2.604 billion (4.64% of GDP), which would be equivalent to the accumulated NFPS deficit for the year up to that month. With this additional financing, public debt as of July 2025 reached US$44.06 billion, mostly non-indexed domestic debt. Therefore, the debt-to-GDP ratio would have fallen to 78.5% of GDP, due to the higher inflation rate experienced by the economy, which is increasing GDP in nominal terms and reducing the real value of domestic debt. The biggest losers from this behavior are the holders of BCB liabilities, primarily the money in circulation that is losing value due to higher inflation, and the members of the pension system, whose pension contributions have been invested in non-indexed public debt securities.

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* Senior Researcher at INESAD, ljemio@inesad.edu.bo
This blog is part of the ADÁMAS ECONÓMICO Project.
The views expressed in the blog are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of their institutions or INESAD.

 

By: Daniela Romero*

Gender inequalities are the result of the historical persistence of systems and of structural discrimination and exclusion factors. In the specific case of women, exclusion is a multi-dimensional issue which leads to precarious situations for women in the conditions and their actions in economic, social and political spheres (Moreno and Anderson, 2015: 169-171). The sexual division of labor, as a structural reality, is one of the main bases for this exclusion, and, in general, for generating inequality and injustice, mainly of an economic nature, affecting women. Across the globe, in general, women earn less than men, as it is more likely form them to work independently and in unpaid family jobs. Besides this, they are more prone to performing low-productivity activities and working in the informal sector, with less likelihood of mobility towards the formal sector than men (World Bank, 2012). Read More »

By Daniela Romero*

Since the 1990s, the gender approach has been included in the debate of international conferences and in government policies and programs around the globe. In addition, this has led to the emergence of many women’s organizations that promote use of the concepts of the approach from both an activist and scientific perspective. Despite this, gender conditions and relations that vulnerate the lives of many women are still present in a diversity of contexts, particularly rural ones, where conditions of inequality and poverty persist. In this sphere, beyond rhetoric, social projects have not been able to deal with and/or go sufficiently deeper in the structural aspects that perpetuate such conditions. It is thus necessary for the new interventions to incorporate the gender approach in a more active way, fostering the transformation of gender relations from within the family, starting with the men and women themselves, identifying their individual and collective skills, interests and aspirations (Rodríguez, 2015). Read More »

By: Lykke E. Andersen*

Economists distinguish between open and hidden unemployment, and I think it is possible to introduce a similar distinction in the area of gender inequality.

I will define open gender inequality as that which is reflected in all the traditional gender indicators, such as gender gaps in school enrolment, gender differences in labour market participation rates, gender pay gaps, etc. I would usually have referred to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators for such data, but they have been updating their website, and I can’t find anything anymore. The United Nations system for SDG indicators is even worse. Instead, Our World in Data has vastly improved, so that is my new go-to site for all kinds of development statistics, including gender inequality data (https://sdg-tracker.org/gender-equality).

Read More »

By: Lykke E. Andersen*

There has been a lot of focus lately on the extreme levels of gender inequality in economics (e.g. Economics is the most dismal of sciences in terms of gender inequality). According to the IDEAS/RePEc ranking of more than 50 thousand economists in the world, only 19% of registered economists are women, and they are much rarer than that among the top ranked economists (https://ideas.repec.org/top/#authorscountry).

Typically, there are only about a handful of women among the top 100 economists in any particular country. In the Netherlands there is just 1, in the United States 3, in Canada 4, in Sweden 5, in the UK, Germany, Norway and Italy 8, and Denmark seems to hold the record with 10. (Do let me know in the comments below if you find a country with more than 10 women among the top 100 economists according to RePEc, because I didn’t check the countries with names that were too unfamiliar to me).

Read More »

By: Lykke E. Andersen*

While the World’s education systems currently favour girls and women across most of the World (1), with 112 women enrolled in university for every 100 men worldwide (2), this educational advantage has yet to translate itself into more lucrative and prestigious positions for women. This is particularly so in the economics profession.

Only one woman has ever been awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics (Elinor Ostrom in 2009), whereas in Physics there are 2 female Nobel Prize winners, in Chemistry 4, in Medicine 12, in Literature 14, and 16 women have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (3).

That women have trouble rising to the top in the economics profession is also reflected by the fact that there are currently only eight countries in the World in which the highest ranked economist is a woman (4). In at least three of those cases, however, the female researcher does not actually live in the country, but is rather affiliated with an institution in the country, while currently living in another country (5). Thus, only five countries in the world has a top economist, who is both female and actually lives in the country: Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda. In contrast, there are 120 countries in which the top ranked economist is male (see Map 1). For the remainder of the countries, no data was available, as no economists at all had registered at RePEc.

Read More »

By: Lykke E. Andersen*

Today is the International Day of Persons with Disabilities, and I wanted to share some data from the latest Bolivian Population Census (2012), which was unusual, because it included questions about disabilities for the first time. According to this census, disability is not that common in Bolivia. Less than 2% of the population have difficulties seeing, and less than 1% have difficulties either hearing, speaking, walking or remembering (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Percentage of the Bolivian population with some kind of disability, 2012

Read More »

By: Lykke E. Andersen*

Despite my initial hesitations about going ahead with the 8^th Bolivian Conference on Development Economics much too late and without any confirmed sponsors, I have to admit that the 8th BCDE conference, carried out at UPB-Cochabamba this week, was once again a big success, and that I have thoroughly enjoyed two intensive days of frontier development research and networking in Cochabamba.

One of the main benefits of organizing the BCDE conference is the chance to invite and meet amazing people. This year, I was particularly delighted to meet Sara Farley of the Global Knowledge Initiative. Her keynote speech was about Collaborative Innovation, and while that was very inspiring in itself, it was even more interesting to hear, over dinner, how she applies that concept to everything in her own life (even her recent hiking & camping wedding on a mountain top in the US). I would love to try to apply some of her methods and strategies to the complex development problems of Bolivia.

Read More »

Agnes Medinaceli Baldivieso*

Most people try to avoid procrastination. However, I’m pretty sure that everyone has fallen into this pit, at least once. Of course, putting off things has its benefits from time to time (1). Some even think that procrastination is the fuel of creativity (2). Apparently Steve Job’s success is attributed to his procrastination skills! (3). However, if creativity is not needed to fulfil a task, which is generally the case, then procrastination ends in regret and sometimes even in severe welfare losses (4). But, why do we procrastinate if we know that the costs in the long run are generally higher?

Read More »